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Abstract: To be successful in multi-attribute auction, agents must be capable of adapting to continuous changing bidding
price. This paper presents a novel fuzzy attitude based bidding strategy (FA-Bid), which employs dual assess-
ment technique i.e. assessment of multiple attributes of the goods as well as assessment of agents attitude
(eagerness) to procure an item in automated auction. The assessment of attributes adapts the fuzzy sets tech-
nique to handle uncertainty of the bidding process as well use heuristic rules to determine attitude of bidding
agents in simulated auctions to procure goods. The overall assessment is used to determine a price range based
on current bid, which finally selects the best one as the new bid.
1 INTRODUCTION
The emergence of electronic market places has
dramatically increased the opportunities for the online
auctions (e.g. eBay, Amazon etc.). Intelligent agent
technology [Anthony and N.R.Jennings, 2002, Byde
et al., 2002, Greenwald and Stone, 2001, He et al.,
2003] provides a powerful mechanism to address
complex problems of dynamic pricing in automated
auctions. The agents can use different auction mecha-
nisms (e.g. English, Dutch, Vickery etc.) for procure-
ment of goods or reaching agreement between agents.
The agent makes decisions on behalf of consumer and
endeavours to guarantee the delivery of item accord-
ing to the buyers preferences. In these auctions buy-
ers are faced with difficult task of deciding amount
to bid in order to get the desired item matching their
preferences. For this reason, the formalisation of bid-
ding mechanism has received a great deal of attention
from the agent community for the past decade. These
software agents should be smart enough to bargain a
favourable deal for the user. In order to be called an
intelligent agent the software must satisfy several cri-
teria like autonomy, temporal continuity, communi-
cation and cooperation. To this end, a number of re-
searchers [P.Anthony and N.R.Jennings, 2003,Kowal-
cyzk and Bui, 2000, Luo et al., 2003, Ma and Le-
ung, 2007,P.Stone et al., 2001] have reported different
frameworks that help an autonomous agent to tackle
the problem of bidding in auctions. Currently, no sin-
gle implementation satisfies all the criteria, but there
are several promising results for bargaining intelligent
agents.
In this paper, a fuzzy bidding strategy (FA-Bid) is
designed in an automated auction based on the dual
assessment of multiple attributes of items as well as
agents attitude on bidding item. To quantify attitudes
and to deal with uncertainty of attribute assessment
fuzzy sets technique is applied in the presented strat-
egy. The basic procedure of the strategy is shown in
Figure 1. The remainder of the paper is organized as
below. First, the detail of the presented strategy is
illustrated. Then, a simple experiment is conducted.
Related work and conclusion are discussed finally.
2 A FUZZY BIDDING STRATEGY
(FA-BID)
In an automated auction, an agent’s bidding ac-
tivity is influenced mainly by two aspects, namely, 1)
the attributes of goods and 2) the agent’s attitude. Any









Figure 1: A Fuzzy Bidding Strategy (FA-Bid) model.
ing bids will dampen the established attitude of an
agent on the goods. All these facts require an intel-
ligent agent system, plays the role of an agent’s rep-
resentation, to adopt an appropriate bidding strategy.
Considering the existence of uncertainty in a real auc-
tion situation, this paper focuses on how to make bid
by using the agent’s personal perspective.
To make a bid for a unit of goods, the agent should
balance between his/her assessment on the goods and
his/her attitude (aspiration) to win an auction. Gen-
erally speaking, an agent has stronger eagerness to
make bid for a quality goods rather than a lower one.
The eagerness is mainly based on the assessment on
the goods. Moreover, an agent’s attitude is also influ-
enced by the bids because price is the unique factor
through which agents and an auctioneer negotiate till
make a deal. To win an auction, an agent must bal-
ance among the price (bid), assessment on the goods
and attitude to win a bid.
Roughly speaking, the bidding procedure runs as
follows:
• Firstly, evaluation on each related attributes is de-
termined.
• Then these evaluations are aggregated to form an
overall assessment on the goods.
• Next, the attitude of the agent is determined.
• Overall assessment is conducted.
• Finally, a new bid is determined.
Since in real situation uncertainty exists ubiqui-
tously in expressing assessments, eagerness as well as
their relationships with price, this paper uses fuzzy-
set-based method to process uncertainty in assess-
ment and eagerness. First of all, this paper uses a
satisfactory degree measure as the common universe
of assessment, i.e., an assessment is treated as a fuzzy
set on the satisfactory degree. Secondly, an eagerness
is expressed as a fuzzy set on the set of assessments,
i.e., the assessment set is the universe of eagerness.
In the following sections, details of the strategy is
illustrated.
2.1 Attribute Evaluation
Attribute evaluation includes two kinds of pro-
cess. The first one is individual attribute assessment,
and the second one is assessment aggregation. To
implement attribute evaluation, three issues are con-
cerned, i.e., attribute weights (relative importance)
adjustment, assessment expression, and assessment
aggregation.
2.1.1 Weights adjustment
Weight adjustment implements dynamically
change relative importance of multiple criteria. In a
real situation an agent’s personal preference on the
attributes seldom has quickly fluctuation, i.e., the
weights for criteria is relatively stable in a long run.
The adjustment of weights resulted from the price
should be limited to a rational range. Moreover, the
adjustment shouldn’t change the relative significance
among criteria other than the price because raising
price alters the relative significance of it to other
criteria. In the following, the agent’s preference
is treated as an initial weight vector which is the
basis of the adjustment. To construe an initial
weight vector, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)
method [Saaty, 1980] is applied because it is proved
validate in practice although it may induce inner
inconsistency. Suppose the obtained initial weight
vector is W (0).
Suppose the current bid pc belongs to [pl, pu]⊆ R
where pl and pu are the lower and upper boundaries
of possible bids respectively which are determined by
the auction. Let C = {c0,c1, . . . ,cK} be the set of
K + 1 attributes and W = {w0,w1, . . . ,wK} is the set
of weights for attributes in C.
Because except the price agent’s assessments on
other criteria do not change, the adjustment of weight
for price should be determined first. Suppose [−δ,δ]
is the adjustable range of the weight for price and the
current net increasing of weight for price is Δw0, then
the current weight vector is determined by
w′0 = w0 + Δw0 (1)
w′k = wk ·
1−w′0
1−w0 , k = 1,2, . . . ,K. (2)





wk = 1, (3)
and the relative significance of the criteria except for
the price will not change after this adjustment.
2.1.2 Assessment Expression
Since uncertain expressions are often used in a
real situation, this paper uses linguistic terms to ex-
press assessments. These linguistic terms are illus-
trated by fuzzy set. Moreover, the universe of these
fuzzy set are unified to real interval [0,1] which means
the satisfactory degree of the agent to a particular at-
tribute. Therefore, all fuzzy sets have same universe
which is convenient for aggregating assessments.
Suppose gk (k = 0,1, . . . ,K) is the satisfactory de-
gree measure for attribute ck. Then an agent’s opin-
ion on the goods in terms of attribute ck is denoted
by gk(u) where u(∈ Uk) is the real attribute value of
attribute ck and Uk is the real universe for attribute
ck. For instance, departing time is an attribute for a
flight ticket. The possible departing time in a day is
from 0 : 00 to 23 : 59. For any time slot u, a client
may present a satisfactory degree such as departing at
7 : 30 is with satisfactory degree 0.9 and departing at
3 : 00 is with 0.3.
In the following, let A = {a1, . . . ,an} be the set of
used assessment terms which are fuzzy sets on sat-
isfactory degree [0,1]. Then a numeric satisfactory
degree is transformed to a linguistic term. Continue
the above example, suppose the assessment set is as
shown in Figure 2. Notice that a7 is with the biggest
the membership degree for 0.9, the assessment for de-
parting at 7 : 30 is a6 by the maximum membership
degree principle. Similarly, the assessment for 0.3 is
a2.
2.1.3 Assessments Aggregation
An aggregated assessment is the agent’s overall
opinion/preference on the goods in terms of multiple
attributes. Take booking a flight ticket for example,
an assessment is made on a ticket usually based on
the airlines, flight departure and arrival time, flight
type, aircraft types, seat positions, as well as price.
The change of an attribute’s value may leads to the
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Figure 2: Obtain overall assessment.
alternation of an assessment. Instinct natures of dif-
ferent attributes increase the difficulty and uncertainty
for obtaining an overall assessment. Notice that an
agent’s preference on an individual attribute can be
expressed through the agent’s satisfactory degree on
that attribute. This paper uses an satisfactory degree
measure as the common universe of assessment.
Based on assessment on each individual attribute,
an overall assessment can be obtained as follows.
Suppose the individual assessments of all attributes
are v0, v1, . . ., vK and the weights of them are w0, w1,
. . ., wk respectively. Then an overall assessment is ob-
tained by
a = Agg{(v0,w0),(v1,w1), . . . ,(vK ,wK)} (4)
where Agg is a selected aggregation method, vk ∈ A
(k = 0,1, . . . ,K) is the linguistic assessment on at-
tribute ck.
To get an overall assessment in terms of a set of
criteria, an aggregation method Agg is applied. Some
existing methods can be used here, such as OWA
operator [Yager, 1993, Yager, 2004], 2-tuple linguis-
tic aggregation [Delgado et al., 1999, Delgado et al.,
2001, Herrera et al., 2001], and Weighted-sum. For
convenience, we use the weighted-sum-based method
to obtain an overall assessment as follows.





wk · vk(u), u ∈ [0,1], (5)
where vk(u) is the membership degree of u in vk.






Finally, we select the nearest term(s) a to ã as the
overall assessment.
For example, A has seven terms, namely, a1, a2,
· · · , a7 as shown in Figure 2. Suppose ã is the obtained
fuzzy set. By comparing the distances between ã and
each element in A, we know a6 is the nearest item to
ã. Hence, a6 will be taken as the overall assessment.
2.2 Attitude Estimation
Customer’s attitude is his or her willingness to bid
for a unit of goods, which is related to but not the
same as the overall assessment on the given goods.
After conducting new assessment on the goods ac-
cording to current price pc, estimation of agent’s atti-
tude is implemented. In order to do so, the relation-
ship between attitude and assessments is required. In
general, the better the assessment on the given goods
is, the stronger the attitude of bidding for that goods
will be. However, this is by no means the unique re-
lationship between attitude and assessment. For in-
stance, other agents’ competitive bidding sometimes
can also cause strong willingness. In this paper, we
mainly focus on the factor of assessment and extract
this relationship from the agent’s transaction records.
Suppose E = {e1, . . . ,em} is the set of attitude ex-
pressions, A = {a1, . . . ,an} is the set of assessments,
and T = {t1, . . . ,tL} is the agent’s transaction records
such that ti = 1 if the client won the transaction ti, oth-
erwise ti = 0. Because in each transaction, the agent’s
assessment and attitude occur simultaneously, a set of
formal rule, denoted by R, thus can be extracted from
T such that any r ∈ R is of form
r : (ai ⇒ e j,αi j), (7)
where ai ∈ A, e j ∈ E, and αi j is the reliability degree
obtained by
αi j =
|{t ∈ T |ai,e j occur in t and t = 1}|
|{t ∈ T |ai occurs in t and t = 1}| . (8)
Such rule depicts the approximate degree of agent’s
attitude e j to which the agent can win the bid un-
der the assumption that the overall assessment is ai.
Furthermore, these rules can be treated as a set of
fuzzy sets on A such that the membership degree in
a fuzzy set f j corresponding to eagerness e j is αi j.
Obviously, f j is an integration of rules (ai ⇒ e j,αi j)
(i = 1, . . . ,n), which is able to be treated as an alias of
e j. Hence, the fuzzy set f j is also called attitude in
the following without other specification.
Based on the rules in R, an agent can estimate the
possible attitude of the agent when it learns the cur-
rent overall assessment. set of fuzzy sets is obtained
through the following way: suppose the overall as-
sessment is ac, then the attitude at the moment is de-
termined by the maximum membership degree prin-
ciple
ec ∈ E(ac) = {e j ∈ E| f j(ac)  fi(ac) if i = j}. (9)
Notice that such determined ec may not necessarily be
unique. In the following, we call E(ac) the candidate
attitude set under ac.
Once the current attitude of the agent is determine,
requirements for search new bids can then be deter-
mined. The main requirements include identifying
required overall assessment and finding the candidate
prices.
2.3 Overall assessment
Prerequisite of overall assessment is the basic re-
quirement on the goods such that the agent has the
highest possibility to win a bid under the current atti-
tude.
To find the prerequisite of overall assessment, an
order is firstly defined in E according to the strength
of attitude. Without loss of generality, suppose ei < e j
if i < j. Therefore, it is possible to select the strongest
element from E(ac). Then the strongest element in
E(ac) is chosen as the first candidate attitude to deter-
mine the prerequisite of overall assessment. From the
agent’s transaction records, a set of rules R̄ is deter-
mined such that any r̄ ∈ R̄ is of form
r̄ : (e j ⇒ ai, ᾱi j), (10)
where e j ∈ E, ai ∈ A, and ᾱi j is the reliability degree
obtained by
ᾱi j =
|{t ∈ T |ai,e j occur in t and t = 1}|
|{t ∈ T |e j occurs in t and t = 1}| . (11)
Based on the maximum membership degree prin-
ciple, a set of candidate assessment is determined
such that
A(ec) = {ai ∈ A| f̄i(ec)  f̄ j(ec) if i = j}, (12)
where f̄i is the counterpart to fi. Each element a in
A(ec) is called a candidate assessment under eager-
ness ec.
2.4 Agent price determination
An agent’s assessment demonstrates some expec-
tion on the quality of the goods. As other criteria ex-
cept the price are seldom changeable in an auction,
this is regarded in terms of price.
Suppose U0 = [pl, pu] is the real range of price. A
price range U(a) corresponding to a candidate assess-
ment a is a subset of U0 such that for any u∈U(a), the
assessment based on u and W is a. Notice that an as-
sessment is a fuzzy set on the satisfactory degree [0,1]
which is the bridge between assessment and price, a
price range is determined by the following steps.
Step 1: We divide the satisfactory degree [0,1]
into n subsets D1, D2, . . ., Dn such that
ai(d)  a j(d) (13)
for any d ∈ Di and j = i, i.e., element in Di with
biggest membership degree in ai.
Step 2: For Da corresponding to a candidate as-
sessment a, we select price in U0 such that ga(u)∈Da.
Ua is called a candidate bid set. Concerning that the
satisfactory degree is continuously change with the
price, we assume that Ua is an interval in U0. Hence,
let pla and pua be the left and right boundary of Ua.
Thus, a candidate price range for assessment a is
determined.
Suppose for any element in A(ec), we have ob-
tained a corresponding candidate price range. Be-
cause new bid should higher than the present price
pc, a candidate price set for A(ec) is determined by
UA = {pli|pli > pc,ai ∈ A(ec)}
∪{pui|pui > pc,ai ∈ A(ec)}.
As it can be seen that the candidate price range
may not exist under some assessments, in these case,
a weaker attitude is selected to repeat the candidate
price determination process until a range is found or
the attitude is weaker than an acceptable level.
Suppose UA is a found price range, there must be
a smallest element b in it. Then b is selected as the
new bid.
3 EXPERIMENT EVALUATION
In this section, an experiment implements the
fuzzy bidding strategy in a scenario in which an agent
intends to book flight tickets. Six factors (as shown
in Table 1) are concerned in this situation, i.e. ticket
price (c0), depart time (c1), arrival time (c2), num-
ber of stops (c3), seat positions (c4), and travel season
(c5). The flight ticket bid for is a return ticket to des-
tination D with the following properties:
- price: $800 – $2000;
- depart time: 18:00 PM, Wednesday;
- return arrival time: 10:00 AM, Friday;
- number of stops: 1;
- seat position: window;
- travel season: April (off-peak season).
Suppose the identified perspective of an agent is
summarized as below:
Table 1: Concerned attributes of a flight ticket.
Attributes Symb. Values range Weights
price c0 $[800–2000] 0.4
depart time c1 Sun. 0:00 – Sat. 24:00 0.1
arrival time c2 Sun. 0:00 – Sat. 24:00 0.1
stops c3 0, 1, 2, 3 0.1
seat position c4 window, aisle, middle 0.1
flight season c5 Jan. 01 – Dec. 31 0.2
• The agent prefers to a cheaper ticket and agrees to
that the cheaper the better.
• The agent prefers to travel at the weekend rather
than at working day.
• The agent prefers to no stop travel.
• The agent prefers to aisle seat then window seat.
• The agent prefers to travel during off-peak season
rather than peak season.
• The agent thinks the flight price is the most impor-
tant factor, secondly the travel season, and other
factors are of same importance.
Based on the agent’s perspective, the agent evaluates
the ticket using seven terms (shown in Figure 3), i.e.,
very bad (a1), bad (a2), slightly bad (a3), acceptable
(a4), fairly good (a5), good (a6), and very good (a7).
The seven terms are expressed by fuzzy sets on the
satisfactory degree [0,1] as below (see Figure 3):
fai = e
−162(x−(i−1) 16 )2 , i = 1, . . . ,7. (14)




c2 fairly good (a5)
c3 slightly bad (a3)
c4 acceptable (a4)
c5 good (a6)
As the ticket price is the changeable factor, the as-
sessment on it is determined dynamically. For conve-
nience, suppose the agent’s satisfactory degree mea-






Now assume the current price (pc) is $900, the
agent is required to determine a new bid in this sit-
uation.
First, the satisfactory degree of the current price
is calculated by Eq. (15), which is 0.91. Because
fa7(0.91) = 0.35 and fa6(0.92) = 0.82, the assess-
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Figure 4: Overall assessment.
Next, since the price changes will affect the
weights of all factors, a new overall assessment of
the ticket is calculated. Suppose the increase of price
weight is 0.05, i.e., the current weight of price is
w′0 = 0.45. Then the weights of other factors are cal-









Therefore, a fuzzy set ã(u) is obtained (ã(u) in Figure
4). Then by Eq. (6), the most nearest assessment to ã
is a6. So the new overall assessment for the ticket is
a6.
Then the agent needs to estimate the agent’s atti-
tude according to this assessment. Suppose the agent
uses five terms to distinguish the attitude, i.e., none
(e1), slightly (e2), medium(e3), strong (e4), and very
strong (e5). In order to estimate the agent’s attitude, a
set of rules of form Eq. (7) are extracted from a his-
torical auction records, which are illustrated in Table
2 and Figure 5.
By Figure 5, the agent’s attitudes at this moment
are e2 and e3 because they have the highest reliability.
Table 2: Rule set for attitude estimation.
attitude
ass. e1 e2 e3 e4 e5
a1 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.27 0.13
a2 0.10 0.28 0.22 0.26 0.13
a3 0.10 0.26 0.18 0.32 0.13
a4 0.17 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.12
a5 0.12 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.16
a6 0.12 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.13















Figure 5: Illustration for rule set R.
Because e3 is stronger than e2, the agent first searches
possible bids under the attitude e3. Based on e3, the
agent discovers that a6 is the most preferred assess-
ment on the ticket through rules in Table 3. Hence,
it will determine a candidate price range based on the
assessment a6.
Based on Figure 3, the agent can divide the satis-
factory degree interval [0,1] into seven sub-intervals.
In this figure, the interval corresponding to assess-
ment a6 is $[900–1100] and the current price pc be-
longs to this interval. Hence, a new bid can be se-
lected from the interval. According to the FAB-
strategy, the smallest one greater than the pc(900) will
be selected. For instance, if the least increase is $50,
then the new bid b is $950.
Table 3: Rule set for prerequisite of assessment identifica-
tion.
assessment
att. a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
e1 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.06
e2 0.07 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.06
e3 0.07 0.18 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.09
e4 0.09 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.06
e5 0.08 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.05
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a novel attitude-based agent’s bid-
ding strategy (FA-Bid) is discussed. It was noticed
that agents, which adopt attitudes, behave more flex-
ibly and efficiently than agents without attitude and
adapt more easily to dynamic situations. Another
unique idea presented in this paper is that to deal
quantitatively the imprecision or uncertainty of multi-
ple attributes of items to acquire in auctions, fuzzy set
technique is used. The fuzzy logic provides attitude
based agents provide resources in the decision mak-
ing process of bidding agent. The bidding strategy
also allows for flexible heuristics both for the over-
all gain and for individual attribute evaluations. It
also explores the relationships between evaluations of
different attributes using Analytic Hierarchy Process
method [Saaty, 1980].
There are a number of areas of further investiga-
tion. In future we would further like to explore the
development of strategies for multiple auctions. We
would also like to compare our bidding techniques
with other decision theoretic approaches to determine
the relative strengths and weaknesses of these meth-
ods. Different strategies may perform well in some
environments but may perform poorly in another. The
numbers of strategies that can be employed are end-
less and the search space is huge. To address this is-
sue, we intend to use learning techniques to obtain a
model of the price dynamics based on the past data
and to search for most successful strategies in prede-
fined environments in an offline fashion.
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